Ideology
and archaeology
in Turkey
ÖZDOĞAN, M. 1998.
Ideology and
archaeology in
Turkey, in L.
Meskell (ed.).
Archaeology under
fire. Nationalism,
politics and
heritage in the
Eastern
Mediterranean and
Middle East: 111-24.
London: Routledge.
Mehmet Özdogan
Setting the stage
Archaeology, and the
active interest in
constructions of the
the past, is an
innovation that was
initiated, and
subsequently
evolved, in Europe.
One could define
archaeology as a
perspicacious
perception of the
past that developed
as one of the key
elements of modern
“Western”1 culture.
As a concept,
archaeology is
closely linked with
Western ideology and
it is no coincidence
that—in spite of the
extensive field work
taking place all
over the world—ideas
on how
archaeological data
should be evaluated
are still being
undertaken primarily
in the West. At
present, almost
every state in the
world, regardless of
its economic status,
cultural or
historical
background, is
involved at some
level in
documenting, or at
least in
considering, the
past. However, the
type of archaeology
that is being
implemented differs
considerably
according to the
ideological and/or
political setting of
each country (Arnold
1996; Banks 1996;
Fleury-Ilett 1993;
Mouliou 1996). One
could say that while
some nations are
theorising
archaeology, most
nations are rather
unconsciously
practicing
archaeology.
Archaeology began in
Turkey as an
imported concept. As
such, it remained as
an élite pursuit
until it was
integrated with the
ideological
framework of the
Republic. At
present, Turkey is
one of the few
countries where a
local tradition in
archaeology has
developed. It also
occupies a unique
position being
located between the
West and the East.
Turkey’s position is
not just a matter of
geographical
location—in the last
two centuries it has
vacillated between
Western and marginal
Western models.
Throughout history,
and at present, its
position has had a
decisive impact on
the formation of
Anatolian cultures.
The impact of this
intermediary
position between the
East and the West
can also be traced
in the ideological
formation of
archaeology in
Turkey.
The events that led
to the emergence of
modern Turkey are
poorly known in the
West, and without
this knowledge,
neither the motives
that stimulated the
development of
archaeology in
Turkey, nor the
status of its
current problems,
can be comprehended.
Throughout this
chapter occasional
remarks are made to
illustrate the
historical
background of these
events.
The beginnings of
Turkish archaeology
go back to the early
years of the
nineteenth century,
to the time when the
traditional Ottoman
state was
experiencing what
can be termed as a
‘process of
Westernisation’.
Accordingly,
archaeology in
Turkey developed
simultaneously
through the events
that led to the
emergence of the
modern Republic of
Turkey.
Turkey is an Islamic
country that for
over half a
millennia, as the
only leading power
of the Islamic
world, had to
confront European
powers. Yet there
are considerable
discrepancies
between Turkey and
the other Middle
Eastern and Islamic
countries: these
differences are not
only restricted to
distinct linguistic
and ethnic origins,
but Turks in general
have never been
orthodox in their
religious beliefs.2
In spite of sharing
the same religion,
Turks (having their
origins in remote
Asia) and Arabs
(having totally
different origins
and social habits),
never developed a
genuine liking for
each other. Both in
the Seljuk and in
the Ottoman Empires,
while people of
Turkic origin were a
minority, members of
the Eastern
Christian churches
were at least as
populous as their
Islamic
counterparts. Thus,
when compared with
the contemporary
states in Europe,
all Turkish states
were highly
pluralistic, being
composed of diverse
ethnic, racial,
linguistic and
religious groups.
This seems to have
characterised
Anatolia from
prehistoric times to
the present. With
some justification
it can be stated
that the Turkish
population of the
Ottoman Empire
accorded better with
their local Orthodox
subjects than with
other Islamic
populations.
Consequently, the
Ottomans had
inherited both the
traditional hatred
and mistrust of its
Orthodox subjects to
the Catholic World
and also the
physical boundary
between the East and
the West.3 This
border endured, both
physically and
conceptually, for
centuries.
The process of
Westernisation in
Turkey was not a
linear development.
As can be expected
it was, and still
is, full of
controversies.
First, it was a
‘state oriented’
process, mainly
imposed by the newly
emerging élite and
even, in some cases,
by the personal
initiatives of the
Sultans, implemented
at the expense of
confronting most of
its subjects.
Turkey’s struggles
to change its system
to a European one
coincided in Europe
with the peak of
“anti-Turkish”
trends, motivated
under the impact of
highly romanticized
Hellenism. While
Turkey was trying to
integrate within the
European cultural
system, Europe was,
and still is,
reluctant to accept
it, occasionally
resulting in
double-standards.
The emergence and
the development of
archaeology in
Turkey took place
under constraints
that are deeply
rooted in history.
Confrontation
between the
traditional Islamic
framework and the
Western model, the
endeavor to survive
as a non-Arabic
nation in the Middle
East while the
Empire was
disintegrating, the
hostile and
occasionally
humiliating attitude
of Europeans, and
growin nationalism
have all been
consequential in
this development.
The extremely rich
archaeological
potential of the
country served to
stimulate a
developing interest
in archaeology.
However, compared to
other Middle Eastern
states where similar
potential exists,
Turkey can claim to
have developed a
long tradition in
archaeology. Turkey
not only became the
first Islamic
country to develop a
critical view on
cultural heritage,
but it is the only
one where a
continuum has been
established between
local politics and
science. This is
clearly demonstrated
by the fact that
Turkey offers a rare
case where
scientific
research—both by
foreigners and Turks
—could endure,
without any
obstructions, for
over a century.4 I
consider that the
pace that
archaeology took in
Turkey is much more
related to the
ideology of the
modern Republic than
to the existing
archaeological
potential of the
country.
The modern Republic
of Turkey, founded
in 1923, is the
direct descendant of
the Ottoman empire
which, up to 1829
(the year when
Peloponnese seceded
from the Empire),
extended over the
Near East, Northern
Africa, Caucasus,
Cyprus and to most
of the Balkan
peninsula, including
Greece and the
Aegean islands.
Almost all the
regions that were
considered the
cradle of
civilisation, thus
appealing to the
archaeologists, were
dominated by the
Ottoman Empire.
During the incipient
years of
archaeology, at the
time when the first
European
archaeologists took
to the field,
Turkey—or the
Ottoman Empire—was
the only non-Western
European country to
face the first wave
of explorers and
archaeologists. This
inevitably had an
impact on the
Ottomans. The
intelligentsia
became engaged in
archaeology,
directly or
indirectly, and came
to consider it at a
relatively early
date. Like other
modern institutions,
archaeology began in
Turkey as an
imitation of that in
the West. No efforts
were spent either
thinking about
archaeological
practices or
adapting archaeology
to local needs. It
was oriented simply
to the Near Eastern,
Hellenistic, Roman
and Byzantine
cultures. The
remains of the
Seljuk or of the
Ottoman periods were
not considered as
antiquities
for a long period of
time.
The traditional
Ottoman perception
of the past
The traditional
Ottoman perception
of the past, as in
most other
non-Western
cultures, was less
dependent on
‘factual’ evidence
or, rather, the
‘facts’ did not
necessarily have to
be as concrete as
they are in the
Western way of
thinking. The
philosophical base
of the Ottoman
Empire, the
forerunner of modern
Turkey, can be
considered as an
amalgamation of
Oriental and Islamic
cultures, having its
roots both in
Central Asia and in
the Near East. The
conception of the
‘past’ was thus more
putative than
empirical. It was,
in a way, an
abstraction without
a temporal
dimension. Thus,
“Antiquarianism…failed
to develop in the
Near East, where
Islamic peoples
lived in the midst
of impressive
monuments of
antiquity” (Trigger
1989:44). There is
an interesting
contradiction in the
Ottoman system. More
than any other
nation, the Ottomans
collected and
meticulously kept
documents and
books—even those
left over from the
Byzantine Period
were saved.
Extremely accurate
records were kept
from all over the
Empire, yielding
minute details about
historical events
and daily
activities. Written
documents,
regardless of their
subject matter, were
saved and archived.
However, these
documents were never
used to write a
“factual” history.
History was more a
tradition beyond the
use of written texts
or documents. It is
not a coincidence,
then, that the
history of the
Ottomans was
inevitably written
by Europeans.
A past based on
“facts”, or the
perception that
ancient remains
constituted evidence
from which to write
a history, was a
concept imported
into the Ottoman
Empire. Most of the
“ancient buildings”
were saved and
esteemed, not
because they were
considered as
indicators of the
past, but because
they were associated
with an atavistic
patrimony. For this
reason, the
traditional Ottomans
considered
inconceivable the
interest shown to
ancient ruins by the
first generation of
European
archaeologists.
The first generation
of European
archaeologists and
the Ottoman Empire
As mentioned above,
the Ottoman Empire
was the first and,
for a considerable
time, the only
non-European state
to meet the initial
wave of European
explorers and
archaeologists. The
latter were at first
ignored, but in
general their
actions were taken
to be the bizarre
deeds of the
Westerners. However,
in time, the looting
of sites and removal
of antiquities by
the Western
explorers infuriated
the newly emerging
intelligentsia of
the Empire.
As a part of the
process of
modernization in the
beginning of the
nineteenth century,
a number of Western
style institutions
had already been
established in the
Ottoman Empire.
Within that context,
in 1846 a collection
of antiquities was
established in
Istanbul (see Arik
1953). In 1868, this
collection was to be
inaugurated as the
Ottoman Imperial
Museum. As the
Empire was still
controlling the Near
East and most of the
Balkans, its
collections grew
rapidly and, in
1891, it moved to a
new building, now
the Istanbul
Archaeology Museum.
By the first decade
of the twentieth
century there were
already a number of
museums in the
provinces, including
Bursa, Selanik
(present
Thessaloniki), Konya
and Sivas. As
archaeology came to
the Ottoman Empire
as an imported
concept through the
impact of Classical
archaeologists, most
of the collections
in the Ottoman
Museums initially
consisted of
Hellenistic, Roman
or Byzantine
antiquities. In
time, Near Eastern
and Egyptian
collections were
added and since then
all antiquities,
regardless of their
cultural origins,
have been collected.
The same trend can
also be envisaged in
selecting sites to
be excavated. During
the last decades of
the nineteenth
century, almost all
the Turkish
excavations were at
sites of Greco-Roman
period, such as
Sidon, Nemrut Dag,
Alabanda, Sipar,
Tralles etc. (Arik
1950:4).
The most significant
contribution made by
the Ottomans to
archaeology was
prohibiting the
export of
antiquities which at
that time might be
considered as
revolutionary. In
1884, Osman Hamdi
Bey, the curator of
the Imperial Museum
and most eminent
figure in the
history of Turkish
archaeology,
formulated a new law
for the protection
of antiquities (see
also Potts, Chapter
10). This law was so
well formulated that
it was maintained
until 1972. Two
important concepts
were introduced by
it: one considering
all antiquities as
the property of the
state, and the other
forbidding the
export of all
antiquities. The
latter was strongly
opposed and, to a
degree, disregarded
by Westerners until
the establishment of
the Turkish
Republic. The major
difficulty in the
implementation of
this law was the
attitude of the
Western
archeologists and
diplomatic services,
not only because
they wanted to
enrich the museums
of their own
countries, but
because they
considered the Turks
ineligible to
possess such
collections. There
are numerous cases
demonstrating this
attitude, but
H.Schliemann’s
smuggling of the
finds from Troy is
the most explicit
case (see Esin
1993). Schliemann
countered the claims
of the Ottoman
government by
stating that
“instead of yielding
the finds to the
government…by
keeping all to
myself, I saved them
for the science. All
the civilized world
will appreciate what
I have done” (ibid.:
185). This view is
also expressed by
Runnels (1997:127):
“He [Schliemann]
shared the widely
held dislike of the
Ottomans that
characterized
Europeans in his
day…his high-handed
behavior …was
excusable, even
laudable.” In
Europe, no one
seriously considered
justifying their
practices eidier in
scientific or in
intellectual
circles.
At the turn of the
twentieth century,
the Ottoman Empire
experienced
considerable
political and
economical
difficulties which
led to a total
collapse.
Considering the
situation, the
ability to maintain
museums without
losing their
collections was a
significant
achievement of the
first generation of
Turkish
archaeologists.
During the last
episode of the
Ottoman Empire,
attempts were made
by certain foreign
diplomatic missions
to receive, as a
present, some of the
outstanding pieces
on display. Such
attempts were, with
certain tact and
persistence,
prevented. More
significant were the
events during the
years of occupation
following the
collapse of the
Empire. After World
War I, when most of
Turkey—and in
particular
Istanbul—was
occupied by the
British and French
troops, the director
of the Imperial
Museum, Ethem Bey,
was able to save the
museums. After
Turkey’s War of
Independence, the
persistent claims of
the government
enabled
archaeological
material, excavated
and removed during
the occupation, to
be partially
repatriated. The
most significant
example of this is
material from the
Protesilaos-Karaagaçtepe
excavations.
It should be
emphasised here that
the illicit export
of antiquities from
the Empire, as well
as accusations of
spying by some
archaeologists such
as T.E. Lawrence,
inevitably resulted
in foreign
archaeologists being
cast as disreputable
characters. With the
growing impact of
nationalism, this
image, at least
among the general
public, has been
sustained up to the
present.
Nationalism and
archaeology in
Turkey
Nationalism, both as
a concept and as an
ideology, developed
in Western Europe
and began impacting
upon the Ottoman
Empire by the first
half of the
nineteenth century.
However, the Turkish
population of the
Empire were the last
to contemplate this
idea. For a
considerable time,
as late as the
1890s, even
intellectuals
educated in the West
considered
nationalism a very
strange idea. The
concept that Turkish
speakers constituted
a single nation is
another idea that
was imported from
the West. Despite
being customary for
Europeans and other
Middle Eastern
peoples to identify
Ottomans with Turks,
throughout most of
its existence the
Ottomans not only
rejected Turkish
identity, but even
considered it
humiliating (see
Güvenç 1996:21–33).5
Following the
collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and
during the formation
of the new Turkish
state, one of the
main concerns of
Atatürk, the founder
of the new republic,
was to propagate
Turkish identity.
Given Turkey’s
situation in 1923
this seemed like an
impossible
achievement since
for centuries being
a Turk (and not an
Ottoman) was
considered
degrading. Moreover,
during the War of
Independence there
was no one, except a
handful of
intelligentsia
educated in the
West, who called
themselves Turkish.
In creating a nation
out of the ruins of
the Ottoman Empire,
it was essential to
formulate an
ideology that would
assure national
pride, give moral
direction and
identity. Most of
the elite of the
time were utterly
desperate and had
lost confidence as a
result of the events
that led to the
collapse of the
Ottoman system. They
took a more
retrospective view
by looking back to
the glorious days of
history and to their
Turkic origins in
Central Asia. Thus,
they promoted the
Pan-Turkist
ideology.
Atatürk was one of
the few, if not the
only person, who
rejected Pan-Turkism
and still had
confidence in
Anatolia. He
developed an
antithesis to the
prevailing Pan-Turkist
ideology and
insisted upon
Anatolia being the
homeland. To
substantiate this
totally new concept,
an ethnohistorical
theory was
formulated, relating
Sumerians and
Hittites to the
Turks, and
integrated into the
ideological
framework of the new
state. This approach
considered Anatolia
and the present
population as an
ethnic amalgamation
of thousands of
years. Pan-Turkists,
who later became the
ideologists of the
racist movements of
the present times,
were rather pleased
with the idea of
affiliating
Sumerians and
Hittites to Turkish
origins, but they
never accepted a
pre-Turkish history
of Anatolia as a
part of their
heritage. In some
respects, conflict
between “Anatolianism”
and Pan-Turkism
continues to the
present day—although
there was some
consensus, at least
in history books, by
stressing both the
Anatolian heritage
and over-stressing
Central Asian
origins. The latter,
particularly in
books written in the
1930s under the
impact of prevailing
nationalistic trends
of its time, posited
a Turkish exodus
from Asian steps.
Atatürk’s view,
summoning all the
pasts of
Anatolia—regardless
of ethnic origin—as
national, was
incorporated into
the ideology of the
modern state.
The motive behind
this ideology has
survived, with some
modifications up to
the present.
Remnants of all
cultures that lived
in Anatolia have
been regarded
impartially, either
in issuing research
permits or in the
funding of
archaeological
expeditions; sites
of Hellenistic,
Byzantine or Turkish
period were treated
equally. For
example, of the
major excavations
conducted in Turkey
in 1995, twentyfour
were on prehistoric
and proto-historic
period sites, thirty
on Hellenistic,
Roman and Byzantine,
and only nine on
Islamic period
sites. Even during
the last decade, the
newly founded
nationalist and
fundamentalist
political parties
have not yet
hampered, but have
begun criticising
the state for
treating pre-
Turkish or
pre-Islamic remains
no differently from
those of the later
periods. One of
their arguments is
based on the fact
that in the Balkan
countries Ottoman
cultural heritage
had been
systematically
destroyed and that
asking for a permit
to excavate sites of
Ottoman period in
most of these
countries (Greece,
for example) would
be unthinkable.
Turkish views on
foreign
archaeological
expeditions
Another political
aspect of
archaeology in
Turkey has been the
relationship between
the “foreign” and
local
archaeologists.
Turkish
archaeologists,
since the last
quarter of the
nineteenth century,
have been active,
not only in the
field, but also in
setting a
legislative basis
regulating
archaeological
activities.
Particularly since
the 1930s the number
of archaeologists,
museums and
institutions has
consistently
increased. In spite
of the presence of a
local archaeological
tradition Turkey is
one of the few
Middle Eastern or
Balkan countries to
maintain good
relations between
the local and
foreign teams. With
the exception of the
1920s, during the
formation years of
the Republic, there
have always been
foreign teams
working in Turkey.
Occasionally there
have been short
episodes of turmoil,
but these stem
primarily from
problems such as
spying and smuggling
and not from
ideological reasons.
The first generation
of Turkish
archaeologists
From the beginning,
archaeology in
Turkey had developed
as an élite
involvement. Almost
all first generation
Turkish
archaeologists were
educated in the
“Western style” and
belonged to
aristocratic
families (see Esin,
forthcoming).
Notable among them
are Osman Hamdi Bey,
Makridi Bey, Halil
Ethem Bey, followed
by Aziz Ogan and
Arif Müfit Mansel,
all eminent scholars
with strong
personalities. The
principles set by
them have continued
to be the
traditional
standpoint of
Turkish archaeology,
regarding all past
cultures as equally
important. At the
same time they have
defended the legal
rights of the
country by the
protection of
antiquities,
rejecting all sorts
of trade and
exportation of
antiquities. They
have also
established as a
tradition the
maintenance of good
relations with
foreign
archaeological
schools working in
Turkey. Yet, two
other serious
implications of this
tradition need to be
mentioned. Due to
their élitist
background, these
early scholars
neither considered
propagating
archaeology to a
more general public
media, nor
stimulating a
consciousness for
past heritage.
Perhaps one positive
consequence of this
‘élitism’ was to
save archaeology
from the political
turmoils that the
country experienced
in the course of
Westernisation.
Being extremely
selective in issuing
excavation permits
by asking high
scholarly standards
is a tradition that
was instigated by
the first generation
of Turkish
archaeologists and
later became the
unwritten official
policy. Unlike most
Middle Eastern
countries, where
young and
unexperienced
archaeologists can
easily get
archaeological
permits, the Turkish
authorities have
been selective, not
only to foreigners,
but even more to the
Turkish
archaeologists.
While bringing
higher excavation
standards to
Anatolia, it
inevitably limited
the number of
excavated sites and,
subsequently, our
knowledge.
Throughout the
1960s, when the
number of excavated
sites per year were
counted in hundreds
thoughout the Middle
East and in the
Balkans, the number
remained below
twenty in Turkey.
In the 1930s,
Atatürk took a
personal initiative
to engage with
archaeology. A group
of students were
sent to Europe,
mainly to France,
Germany and Hungary,
to study
archaeology, the
Turkish Historical
Society was founded,
and Turkish
excavations resumed
in full. In the
years preceding
World War II,
Atatürk invited
German professors,
fleeing from the
Nazi regime, to
Turkey. Most chairs
in archaeology in
the newly founded or
reformed
universities of the
young Turkish
Republic were
allocated to migrant
German professors.
In 1939, this new
influx of academics,
coupled with the
return of students
educated abroad, led
to a significantly
high standard of
teaching in
archaeology. These
students became the
second generation of
archeologists in
Turkey. Even though
archaeological
excavations, such as
Alaca Höyük, were
promptly reflected
in history books,
the actual
popularization of
archaeology did not
take place until the
late 1960s.
The second
generation and women
in archaeology
The first of this
second generation of
Turkish
archaeologists were
educated in Europe.
However, soon after
World War II the new
group of students in
Turkish Universities
took to the field.
It was no longer a
profession for the
élite or aristocrats
but their impact
still persisted. An
interesting aspect
of this generation
was the sudden
increase in the
number of active
female
archaeologists, a
trend that still
continues today. At
present, Turkish
archaeology is
dominated by female
archaeologists, and
most archaeology
departments are
chaired by women.
They also constitute
a clear majority in
museum-based
archaeology. In this
respect, at least in
the Middle East,
Turkey is a unique
case.
Double standards in
protection and
cultural cleansing
of Turkish heritage
On several occasions
Turkey has been
accused of the
“selective
destruction” of
antiquities. As in
all countries
currently undergoing
the process of
industrialization,
considerable
destruction is
unfortunately being
inflicted upon sites
and monuments.
Turkey’s cultural
inventory has not
been completed yet
and, in spite of
existing
legislations,
massive destruction
of sites is taking
place due simply to
inefficient
implementation of
the law.
Nonetheless, I would
argue that the
destruction is
neither culturally
nor religiously
selective. It is
either due to the
growing pressure
caused by expanding
urban, industrial
and tourist centers,
industrialized
agriculture etc., or
is the result of
illicit digging by
treasure hunters.
Intensive
construction
activities currently
taking place in
Turkey have clearly
resulted in the
destruction of
sub-surface
Byzantine deposits,
but the same
activities have
devastated even more
of the Ottoman
remains. With
justification we can
claim that during
the last decades
more Ottoman
archaeology has been
destroyed than any
of the earlier
periods since public
opinion still posits
that Byzantine and
Greco-Roman remains
are antique whilst
Ottoman ones are
not. Even during
conservative
governments the only
case that has been
made public is that
of St Sophia. This
reputed Byzantine
monument, after
being used as a
mosque for over 400
years, was converted
to a museum by
Atatürk. During the
last twenty years
conservative parties
have occasionally
demanded that it
should again be used
as a mosque as it
symbolizes the
conquest of the
town. However, these
demands have been
met with such public
rejection that the
issue has now faded
from current
discussions. It
should be taken into
consideration that
the Ottoman Empire
ruled in the Balkans
and the Near East
for over 600 years
and, to the
Ottomans, the
heartland of the
empire was in fact
the Balkans, not
Anatolia. As such,
most of the
monuments were
erected there. As
late as 1908, all
Macedonia, Western
Thrace and parts of
Bulgaria were still
part of the Ottoman
Empire. Now, almost
nothing of Ottoman
heritage survives in
most of the Balkan
countries. What
survived through
this “cultural
cleansing” are
sample areas of
civilian
architecture
preserved, not as
markers of cultural
heritage, but for
the purposes of
tourism. Some
mosques have been
saved, either by
being converted into
museums or churches,
but other monuments,
particularly the
Turkish cemeteries,
have been wiped out.
On the other hand,
even a brief survey
of the old
territories of the
Ottoman Empire shows
that the area is
still full of
pre-Turkish remains.
After 500 years of
Ottoman rule, Greece
is still full of
ancient Greek and
Byzantine monuments.
There are numerous
old churches and
monasteries
throughout the
Balkans that were
maintained and
repaired during
Ottoman rule.
Turkey, particularly
Istanbul, still has
numerous Byzantine,
Roman and
Hellenistic
monuments, and most
museums have special
departments covering
these periods. Most
of the universities
with programs in
archaeology or art
history have
Classical
archaeology and
Byzantine art
departments. As
previously stated,
most of the current
excavations and
restoration programs
are devoted to
pre-Turkish periods.
Research and
excavation permits
are not rejected for
taking Byzantine
sites or monuments
as their subjects.
In the Balkans,
however, the
situation is
different. Besides
the systematic
destruction of
Ottoman
archaeological
remains, the Ottoman
period has been
omitted as a field
of research.
Considering the
claims of southern
Cypriots (see
Vermeule 1975), one
is
prompted to ask what
remains of the 300
years of Ottoman
heritage in Southern
Cyprus?
There are often
claims in Europe
that Kurdish and
Armenian cultural
heritages in Turkey
are being
overlooked.6
Excavation and
research permits
there are issued by
the Antiquity
Service and I
suggest that it is
misguided to
consider that
applications are
processed according
to potential ethnic
import of a site.
All over Eastern and
Southeastern Turkey
there are, and have
been for a long
period of time,
numerous excavations
covering the entire
time span from the
Neolithic to
Medieval periods.
Numerous Armenian
sites, including Ani
and Ahtamar, have
been excavated and a
number of Armenian
churches have been
restored. For the
most part,
archaeology has not
been linked to
contemporary
polemics surrounding
ethnicity. Yet what
is intended by
Kurdish heritage, or
Kurdish archaeology,
is not clear. Kurds
have lived in that
region for some
millennia under
different tribal
names,7 without
establishing any
state. The area now
populated by Kurdish
peoples has been
part of numerous
kingdoms and
empires, including
the Assyrian,
Mittani, Urartian,
Persian, Achaemenid,
Roman, Byzantine,
Armenian, Arab,
Seljuk, Artuquid,
Eyyubid, Mongolian,
Ottoman and even the
Crusader kingdoms.
Which one of these
should be considered
Kurdish, Turkish or
Arabic? Would such
an approach not lead
to a biased
imposition of
present conflicts
onto the past? Is it
our concern as
archaeologists to
use the past as a
tool either to prove
or disprove racial
origins and claims
which agitate
present conflicts?
Or should we
engender the notion
that the past is
past and, whatever
its character, it
belongs to all of
us?
Treasure hunting and
the antiquities
market
A final area where
archaeology matters
concerns the illicit
looting of ancient
sites to supply the
demands of the art
market. Cultural
heritage in Turkey,
like all
“archaeologically
rich” countries,
suffers considerably
from the exploits of
treasure hunters.
This phenomenon is
provoked by the
antiquity markets of
the Western World
and is not the
result of any
ideological
reasoning. Turkey’s
government, like
that of Northern
Cyprus, has been
desperately
struggling to stop
illicit digging but
it seems that, as
long as there is a
market in the West,
the destruction will
continue. Given
these attempts, the
West should not
accuse these
authorities of being
unconcerned with
illicit digging. To
stop the illicit
export of
antiquities, buying
them in Turkey (for
Turkey) by paying
sums comparable to
the Western
collectors has been
suggested as an
solution. For some
years Turkish
Museums bought from
illicit diggers and,
at the same time,
private museums and
collections were
encouraged. This, of
course, only
encouraged further
destruction of the
sites. Museums
attained
important objects at
the expense of
losing scientific
knowledge of their
contexts. The most
significant
destruction took
place in the East
and, in a few years,
thousands of
Urartian cemeteries
were looted.
Conclusions
In spite of its
significant place in
the development of
local archaeological
traditions Turkish
archaeology, as a
case study, has been
largely omitted or
ignored by Western
scholars working on
the history of
archaeology.
Considering the
large number of my
colleagues that are
fluent in our
language it seems
evident that this
negligence is more
the result of
political biases
than of the
inability to access
documents written in
Turkish. Here we can
conclude with the
quote that ‘Third
World nations resent
those in the West
who would deny them
their past while
claiming history as
their own’ (McIntosh
et al. 1989:74).
Notes
1 Throughout this
paper, “Western
Countries” or
“Western” is used,
not in a
geographical sense,
but as a concept to
indicate countries
that are
conceptually
integrated with West
European culture.
2 Inevitably, this
does not imply that
there were never
cases of religious
orthodoxy, but that
they have all been
short lived. It is
no coincidence that
at present Turkey is
the only secular
state of the Islamic
World.
3 Here it is
interesting to note
that in the Ottoman
Empire most of the
bureaucrats were
from the local
Orthodox population.
The traditional
concerns of the
local Orthodox
subjects against the
West did have
certain
consequences which
hampered the process
of Westernization
(see Berkes
1975).
4 In some other
Middle Eastern
states, such as
Jordan, Syria,
Israel and during
the previous regime
of Iran, it was much
easier for foreign
teams to get
research permits
than in Turkey.
However, in none of
these countries has
this
situation been
uninterrupted and,
often, political
concerns have been
more
influential in
yielding permits to
foreign teams. In
yielding research
permits,
Turkey has been more
selective and thus
more difficult—but I
would argue
that the selection
has been based on
scientific concerns.
5 To the Ottomans,
“Turk” signified
nomadic Turkomans or
simple villagers.
The terms “Turk” and
“Turkey” were
introduced to Europe
by the Crusaders.
In the Ottoman
Empire, Turk as the
name of the nation
was first suggested
in 1874, and with
great concern. After
the introduction of
nationalism and
when, for the first
time, it was
suggested that the
Turkish speakers
constituted
a nation, the
Ottoman
intelligentsia, to
humiliate, named
them “Turkists”
(Berkes 1975:64).
6 Three years ago in
preparing an
Anatolian
archaeological
exhibition for
Belgium, the Belgian
delegation asked
specifically for
Kurdish archaeology
to be represented in
the collection.
7 It should be noted
that the term
“Kurdish” was a
general name given
by
other communities
and not used by
them. What is
generalized as
Kurdish
actually consists of
a number of
different languages
and dialects. In
Turkey
there are two main
Kurdish languages,
Zaza and Girmançi.
Kurds, until a
few decades ago,
identified
themselves either
with their tribal
names or with
language groups.
Bibliography
Arik, R.O. (1950)
Les fouilles
archéologiques en
Turquie, Ankara:
Milli Egitim Basim
Evi.
——(1953) Türk
Müzeciligine Bir
Bakiş, Istanbul:
Milli Egitim Basim
Evi.
Arnold, B. (1996) “
The Past as
Propaganda:
Totalitarian
Archaeology in Nazi
Germany ,” in
R.Preucel and
I.Hodder (eds)
Contemporary
Archaeology in
Theory: A Reader,
Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers: 549–69.
Banks, I. (1996)
“Archaeology,
Nationalism and
Ethnicity,” in
J.A.Atkinson,
I.Banks and
J.O’Sullivan (eds)
Nationalism and
Archaeology
(Scottish
Archaeological
Forum), Glasgow:
Cruithne Press:
1–11.
Berkes, N. (1975)
Türk Dü?üncesinde
Bati Sorunu,
Istanbul: Bilgi
Yayinevi.
Esin, U. (1993) “19.
Yüzyil Sonlannda
Heinrich
Schliemann’in Troya
Kazilari ve
Osmanhlar’la
Iliskileri,” in
Z.Rona (ed.) Osman
Hamdi Bey Ve Dönemi,
Istanbul: Tarih
Vakfi Yurt Yaymlan:
179–91.
—— (in press) “Cumhuriyet’imizin
73. Yilinda Türk
Arkeolojisi,”
Cumhuriyet’in 73
Yilinda Bilim,
Ankara: TÜBA
yayinlari.
Fleury-Ilett, B.
(1993) “The Identity
of France: The
Archaeological
Interaction,”
Journal of European
Archaeology 1, 2:
169–80.
Güvenç B. (1996)
Türk Kimligi,
Istanbul: Remzi
Kitabevi.
McIntosh, R.J.,
McIntosh, S.K. and
Togola, T. (1989)
“People Without
History,”
Archaeology 41:
74–82.
Mouliou, M. (1996)
“Ancient Greece, its
Classical Heritage
and the Modern
Greeks: Aspects of
Nationalism in
Museum Exhibitions,”
in J.A.Atkinson,
I.Banks and
J.O’Sullivan (eds)
Nationalism and
Archaeology
(Scottish
Archaeological
Forum), Glasgow:
Cruithne Press:
174–99.
Runnels, C. (1997) “D.Traill,
Schliemann of Troy:
Treasure and
Deceit,” Journal of
Field Archaeology
24: 125–30.
Shnirelman, V.A.
(1995) “Alternative
Prehistory,” Journal
of European
Archaeology
3, 2: 1–20.
Trigger, B. (1989) A
History of
Archaeological
Thought, Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press.
Vermeule, E. (1975)
“A Note on Cypriote
Antiquities in
Turkish Cyprus,”
Archaeology 28: 58.
More article
Greek Colonies in
the East
Iron Age Caucasia
Greek Colonies in
the East
Greek Penetration of
the Black Sea